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EEC TREATY ARTICLE FIFTY.NINE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICTS LAW




The freedom to provide services within the member states of the Eu-
ropean Community (EC) represents one of the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC Treaty).' These freedoms bind both the member states of the
EC and the EC legislature. Therefore, conflicts rules established to coor-
dinate divergent legal standards in the member states must be consistent
with the freedom to provide services.2 The coordination between these
two concepts is essential, as the establishment of the common market has
had a major impact on the conflicts laws of the member states.
In order to assure the proper functioning of interstate trade a broad-
scale harmonization of all trade related conflicts rules has been de-
manded.3 To this end, three EC member states4 initiated, and formally
* Professor of Law, LLM. (Harvard), Dr.jur. (Munich); Director of the Institute of Interna-
tional Private Law and Comparative Law at the University of Bonn Law School; Member of the
Center for European Economic Law, Bonn Law School.
A different version of this article will be published by Kluwer Publications in INTERNATiONAL
INSuRANcE LAW WrmriN THE EEC (Fritz Reichert-Facilides ed., forthcoming 1992).
1. See TREATr ESTABUSHING THE EuRoPE.AN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 59, which
in pertinent part provides:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to provide
services within the Community shall be progressively abolished during the transitional pe-
riod in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Commu-
nity other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.
Id. This Article governs, inter alia, the provision and reception of insurance services and applies to all
restrictions that may interfere with this freedom. This concept is discussed in detail infra part III.
2. Until now, very little attention has been paid to the degree to which choice-of-law rules,
established for the purpose of harmonizing the laws of the member states, could conflict with the
EEC TREATY. This lack of attention was due to the early belief that the issue would arise only in the
context of the discriminatory application of domestic laws toward subjects of another member state.
For a discussion of the interrelationship between Community law and conflicts law, see Wulf-Hen-
ning Roth, Der EinfluB des Europdischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf das Internationale Privarecht, 55 RABaS
ZEITSCHRIFT FiOR AUS'wNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELsZ] (forthcoming 1991).
3. See, e.g., Ren6 Savatier, Le March! Commun au regard du droit international privi, 48 REVUE
CRMQUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRrvf 237 (1959); Konrad Zweigert, Einige Auswirkungen des Gemein-
samen Marktes auf das Internationale Privatrecht der Mitglitsstaaten, in FEsrsCHRIFr FOR WALTER HALL-
STEIN: PaOBLMaE DES EUROPXISCHEN REcHTs 555, 555 (1966).
130 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:129
submitted, a proposal for the negotiation of a unified conflicts code in
1967. 5 This proposal eventually led to the 1980 Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome Convention), which de-
fines conflicts laws regarding contractual obligations between member
and nonmember states. 6
With regard to the provision of insurance services between member
states, the Commission of the European Communities (Commission)
quickly realized that choice-of-law rules would influence the degree to
which integration of the divergent national insurance markets could be
achieved.7 The Commission's first attempt to resolve divergent insurance
conflicts rules led to the 1971 working paper (Schwartz Report),8 wherein
the Commission proposed the establishment of a common insurance mar-
ket.9 The Commission later issued the Second Non-Life Directive'0 and
the Second Life Directive 1 which employ the location of the risk as one
of their basic connecting factors1 2 for conflicts rules and add mandatory
choice-of-law rules to ensure consumer protection. 13 As will be shown,
the use of location of the risk as a basic connecting factor (though diver-
gent in scope) can be interpreted in accordance with the basic tenets of
Article 59 of the EEC Treaty. The same, however, cannot be said for all
applications of mandatory choice-of-law rules for purposes of consumer
protection. In order to facilitate the analysis of the relationship between
the EEC Treaty and the two Directives in question, this article first exam-
ines the history behind insurance conflicts law in the EC.
4. Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
5. IAN F. FLETCHER, CONFLICT OF LAws AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 147 (1982).
6. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature June 19,
1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
7. See WULr-HENMNO RoTH, INTEnATIONALES VERSICHERUNosvERTRosacsrr 678-85 (1985).
8. Errichtung des Gemeinsamen Marktes ftir Schadensversicherungen (German version), 61
ZErTSCHRIFr FuR DIE rEsAmTE VERSICHERUNcs-WissENSCHAFT 101 (1972) [hereinafter Schwartz Report].
9. Id. In many respects this proposal was the forerunner of the harmonization policy embodied
in the Commission's 1985 White Paper regarding the completion of the Common Market. Complet-
ing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310
final at 27-29 [hereinafter White Paper].
10. Second Council Directive 88/357 of 22 June 1988 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to Direct Insurance Other than Life Assurance and Laying
Down Provisions to Facilitate the Effective Exercise of Freedom to Provide Services and Amending
Directive 73/239/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 172) 1 [hereinafter Second Non-Life Directive].
11. Council Directive 90/619 of 8 November 1990 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to Direct Life Insurance, Laying Down Provisions to Facilitate
the Effective Exercise of Freedom to Provide Services and Amending Directive 79/267/EEC, 1990
O.J. (L 330) 50 [hereinafter Second Life Directive].
12. For example, the connecting point for jurisdictional and choice-of-law purposes. Compare
the similar usage of the term "basic connecting factor" in ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAW S 9 (3d ed. 1977).
13. See Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 7(2); Second Life Directive, supra note 11,
pmbl.
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II. DEVELOPMENTS LEADING UP TO THE SECOND NON-LIFE
DIRECTIVE
A. The Schwartz Report
In the Schwartz Report the Commission proposed the establishment
of a common insurance market. This proposal rested upon four basic
propositions:
(1) authority to supervise interstate insurance services should be
shifted from the state of risk 14 to the exclusive supervision by the state
of the insurer;' 5
(2) regulations concerning taxation, technical reserves and super-
vision techniques should be harmonized;
(3) premarket control16 of policy conditions by supervisory au-
thorities was to be abolished with regard to large risks 17 or transformed
into postmarket control;18 and
(4) important issues of insurance contract law and relevant con-
flicts rules were to be harmonized. 19
The Schwartz Report based its conflicts rules on party autonomy20 and
the principle of characteristic obligation, 21 but it ignored other important
14. The state of risk is generally considered to be that location where the contingency covered
by the insurance policy is located.
15. This is generally known as home country control.
16. Pre-market control refers to the requirement that the authorities pre-approve the policy con-
ditions of the insurance contract.
17. For insurance contracts covering large risks as well as transportation insurance, the Schwartz
Report suggested that the parties should be free to choose of whichever member state's that they
agreed upon. The report disavowed the necessity of harmonizing insurance contract law with regard
to large risks. Schwartz Report, supra note 8, at 108.
Insurance contracts covering large risks include coverage for ships, aircraft, railway rolling stock,
goods in transit, and liability insurance for ships and aircraft.
18. Postmarket control refers to techniques of controlling policy conditions that apply after the
relevant product has been put on the market, i.e., mandatory rules that are applied by the courts in a
subsequent controversy.
19. Schwartz Report, supra note 8, at 112-14, 118-20, 121-24.
20. Party autonomy signifies the freedom of the parties to choose the law applicable to their
contracts.
21. The principle of characteristic obligation refers to a doctrine holding that the law to be
applied is that of the state where the party whose performance is characteristic of the type of contract
in question has its seat or residence. In the insurance context, this doctrine generally dictates that the
law of the state of the insurer applies. This principle is, for example, referred to in Rome Convention
Article 4(2) which establishes a presumption that
the contract is most closely connected with the country where the party who is to effect the
performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the
contract, his habitual residence, or, in the case of a body corporate or unincorporate, its
central administration.
Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2). For an explanation of the principle of characteristic obliga-
tion, which is largely of Swiss origin, see FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 162. For a radical critique, see
RomH, supra note 7, at 316-29.
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considerations of conflicts law such as consumer protection. 22 These con-
flicts rules obligate insurers to abide by only the legal system of the state
in which they are established. This allows insurers to coordinate their
interstate provision of services and to facilitate the development of a com-
mon insurance market. The Schwartz Report stated that applying the law
of the state in which the risk was located would prolong the existence of
traditional national insurance markets and, therefore, was antithetical to
the establishment of a common market.2 3
The Schwartz Report, despite never discussing how EEC Treaty Arti-
cle 59 applied to national conflicts rules, 24 stressed that the Community
would have to foster the basic aims and tenets of the EEC Treaty in its
secondary legislation.25 Thus, the Report called on the Community legis-
lature to harmonize insurance services through conflicts-of-law rules.
B. The Second Non-Life Directive
The final version of the Second Non-Life Directive26 does not adopt
the recommendations set forth in the Schwartz Report. Instead, it states
that the law of the state of risk, rather than that of the state of the in-
surer's seat, is controlling. 27 This general principle is supplemented by
complicated sets of rules regarding party autonomy. One set of rules re-
quires member states to allow for restricted party autonomy in certain
situations28 and to grant unrestricted party autonomy with respect to in-
surance contracts concerning large risks.29 Yet, in another set of rules,
22. The Report applied the principle of characteristic obligation with the seat of the insurer as a
connecting factor as a subsidiary rule. For a definition of seat, see EEC TRF.ArY art. 58.
23. Schwartz Report, supra note 8, at 106-07.
24. Id. at 106-10. There is no indication whatsoever that EEC Treaty Article 59 may have any
effect on non-discriminatory conflict rules.
25. Id. at 110.
26. See supra note 10.
27. Id. art. 7(1)(a), which provides that "[w]here a policy-holder has his habitual residence or
central administration within the territory of the Member State in which the risk is situated, the law
applicable to the insurance contract shall be the law of that Member State." Id. Numerous proposals
for the Second Non-Life Directive were presented subsequent to the Schwartz Report. For a review
of these proposals and the degree to which they deviated from the initial concepts developed by the
Commission, see RoTH, supra note 7, at 684-89.
28. Eg., Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(b). This article provides:
Where a policy-holder does not have his habitual residence or central administration in the
Member State in which the risk is situated, the parties to the contract of insurance may
choose to apply either the law of the Member State in which the risk is situated or the law
of the country in which the policy-holder has his habitual residence or central administra-
tion.
Id. See also id. arts. 7(I)(c), 7(1)(e).
29. See id. arts. 7(l)(f), 5(d)(1) (providing for unrestricted party autonomy with regard to choice-
of-law).
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member states may opt to grant the parties a certain degree of autonomy,
although they are not required to do so.3 0
C. The Rome Convention
The Rome Convention provides a third application of conflict-of-law
rules for insurance contracts covering risks outside the EC.31 The Con-
vention allows the relevant parties not only to choose between the law of
the state of the insurer and that of the policyholder, but to choose any
law that they wish. 32 In some cases, the rules also require the application
of the consumer protection laws of the state where the policyholder
resides. 33
The perpetuation of differing sets of choice-of-law rules for insurance
contracts in the Second Non-Life Directive and in the Rome Convention
has met with strong criticism.3 4 Such a divergence seems to be completely
inappropriate. However, this dichotomy was established to enhance the
insurer's freedom to provide services. 35 It is for this reason that the Rome
Convention excludes from its ambit, insurance contracts concerning risks
located within the Community.36 An interesting question remains re-
garding whether the application of the conflicts provisions of the Rome
Convention is, in actuality, more consistent with the harmonization prin-
ciples required by Article 59 of the EEC Treaty than the Second Life
Directive and Non-Life Directive.
30. See id. art. 7(I)(a) (providing that the member state where the risk is located may opt for
party autonomy). See also id. art. 7(l)(d).
31. Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(3). The Rome Convention, however, applies to rein-
surance contracts irrespective of the location of the risk. See id. art. 1(4).
32. See id. art. 3.
33. The Rome Convention provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, a choice-of-law made by the parties shall not
have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the
mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence:
- if in that country the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific invitation
addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken in that country all the steps necessary
on his part for the conclusion of the contract, or
- if the other party or his agent received the consumer's order in that country, or
- if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from that country to
another country and there gave his order, provided that the consumer's journey was ar-
ranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to buy.
Id. art. 5(2).
34. See, eg., D. LASOK & P. A. STONE, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 355
(1987).
35. Moreover, there is a third group of insurance contracts that is neither covered by the Rome
Convention nor by the Second Non-Life Directive. These are contracts concluded by insurers with
an establishment outside the EC pertaining to risks located in the EC. The Rome Convention can-
not apply to risks situated inside the EC and the Second Non-Life Directive is addressed to insurers
with a seat inside the EC. See, eg., FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 154-55.
36. See Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 OJ.
(C 282) 1, 13.
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III. EEC TREATY ARTICLE 59: THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE
SERVICES
The requirement that any solution developed by the EC in its secon-
dary legislation must be consistent with primary Community law37 has
influenced the discussion concerning the freedom to provide services in
the insurance industry. The two most important primary EC law princi-
ples relevant to the discussion in this article are undistorted competition 38
and nondiscrimination. 39 Both principles were relied upon when it was
argued that choice-of-law rules, formulated without prior harmonization
of substantive insurance contract law, should not competitively disadvan-
tage insurers established in member states that have comprehensive con-
sumer protection.4° Insurers located in these member states should not
be forced to compete with insurers seated in member states that have
lower standards of consumer protection. In its efforts to produce nondis-
criminatory standards among insurers regardless of their location, the
Second Non-Life Directive uses the location of the risk as the primary
objective connecting factor4' and provides only for a limited role of party
autonomy outside the field of large risks. 42 This solution is not wholly
consistent with the freedom to provide services under Article 59.
It is important to note, however, that the scope of Article 59 is differ-
ent from, but not inconsistent with, the choice-of-law provisions of the
Second Non-Life Directive. Article 59 covers the provision of services
between nationals of different member states.43 The criteria in the Sec-
ond Non-Life Directive regarding interstate services apply "where an un-
dertaking, through an establishment situated in a Member State, covers a
risk situated ... in another Member State." 44 Under the Second Non-
Life Directive, the location of the risk need not be in the same member
37. For a more detailed discussion, see RoTm, supra note 7, at 697-99, 717-20.
38. See EEC TReAar art. 3(f) ("the activities of the Community shall include, ... the institution
of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted;...").
39. Id art. 7 ("Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any
special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited.").
40. See, e.g., RoTH, supra note 7, at 718; Martin Herzog, Die Interation der Versicherungsuirtschaft
in die EWG, 23 VErRSiCHER UNSwRTSCHAPr 1509, 1512 (1971); Ernst Steindorff, Dienstleistungsfreiheit
und ordre public, in DIENs EsrtmosFaaHmr UND VRsicHERUNoSAUFsICHrr IM GEMEINSAMEN M.A Kr 79,
112-14 (Maurice Lagrange et al. eds., 1971).
41. An objective connecting factor is a nonconsensual connecting factor, i.e., a connecting fac-
tor not requiring the consent of the parties.
42. See Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 7.
43. Taken literally, a contract concluded between an insurer seated in state A and a policyholder
established in the same state, and covering a risk in state B, is not protected by Article 59 of the EEC
Treaty.
44. Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 12.
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state as the policyholder. 45 Thus, the use of different criteria is consistent
with Article 59 as the choice-of-law provisions of the Second Non-Life
Directive apply to all insurers established in the Community and cover all
risks situated within the Community, irrespective of the residence or ad-
ministration of the policyholder. 46
A. Application of Article 59 to the Acts of the Community
Legislature
The fundamental freedoms of the EEC Treaty are binding on the
Community organs as well as the member states. 47 Accordingly, the
Community legislature cannot oblige the individual member states to en-
act measures that are prohibited by the EEC Treaty.48 In Commission v.
Germany,49 for example, the court implicitly took the view that when the
wording of secondary Community law is open to more than one interpre-
tation, the preferred construction is the one that renders the provision
compatible with the EEC Treaty.50 Therefore, the conflicts rules of the
Second Non-Life Directive and the Second Life Directive must be com-
patible with the standards developed under Article 59.
Article 59 states that "restrictions on the free supply of services
within the Community shall be progressively abolished." 51 Thus, Article
59 covers all restrictions, that may burden the interstate provision of serv-
ices, including conflicts laws, and does not merely prohibit those measures
that discriminate against a foreign provider of insurance services.
The application of mandatory choice-of-law rules has the potential to
influence the contractual obligations of the parties, and therefore the
character of the contract. The quality of insurance as a legal product 52 is
45. Id. art. 2(d).
46. Id. art. 7.
47. See e.g., EBERHARD GRA~rrz, KOMMENTAR zum EWG-VEIRTAo, art. 30 (2d ed. 1990); Wulf-
Henning Roth, The European Economic Community's Law on Serices: Harmonisation, 25 COMMON MKr.
L REv. 35, 72-73 (1988). To illustrate, EEC Treaty Article 3(c) requires member states to abolish any
obstacles that hinder the free movement of persons and services between them. EEC TREATrY art.
3(c). This task must, at least in part, be fulfilled by Community action. Hence, while the Community
legislature may take action to promote and facilitate the interstate provision of services, it may not
infringe upon this basic freedom to provide services. Cf id. arts. 57(2), 66.
48. This follows from the legal nature of the EEC Treaty as an international treaty whose revi-
sion lies in the hands of the member states. See EEC TREATY art. 236. Hence, Community legislation
is meant to comply with the basic principles of the EEC Treaty and not to alter them. Furthermore,
the Community legislature may not call into question the already achieved unity of the Common
Market. Joined Cases 80 & 81/77, Socit& des Commissionaires Rfunis S.A.R.L v. Receveur des
Douanes; Les fils de Henri Ramel v. Receveur des Douanes, 1978 F-C.R. 927, 947.
49. Case 205/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1986 E.C.R. 3755, 2 C.M.L.R.
69 (1987) [hereinafter Commission v. Germany].
50. Id. at 3814, 2 C.M.LR. at 110.
51. EEC TREATY art. 59. For the text of Article 59, see supra note 1.
52. A legal product is a product that exists only in the law.
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determined by the general and special policy conditions of the insurance
contract. Instead of presenting one insurance product for the entire com-
mon market, the insurer would be forced to frame its insurance policies
according to the relevant national insurance law of the individual member
states if the location of risk is used as a connecting factor. This would
inhibit the ability of the insurer to allocate its resources efficiently and,
thus, is contrary to the idea of a single unified market. While mandatory
choice-of-law rules work as a postmarket control, their influence on insur-
ance services is not fundamentally different from traditional schemes of
premarket control through national insurance supervision.5 3
B. Relevant Standards Promulgated by the European Court of Justice
Under EEC Treaty Article 59
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) already has addressed supervi-
sory regulations of the state where the service is to be provided (state of
destination) 5 4 The following analysis will distinguish between regulations
concerning the provision of services and regulations regarding the recep-
tion of services, since different standards apply to these categories.
1. Regulations Concerning the Provision of Services by the Insurer. In
Commission v. Germany the ECJ held that Article 59:
require[s] the removal not only of all discrimination against a provider
of a service on the grounds of his nationality but also all restrictions on
his freedom to provide services imposed by reason of the fact that he is
established in a Member State other than that in which the service is to
be provided.55
The Court stated that with regard to regulations restricting the import of
services, only "imperative reasons relating to the public interest... may
justify restrictions on the freedom to provide services."5 6 Such restric-
tions will be justified only if the state of the service provider's establish-
53. See Norbert Reich, Die Freiheit des Dienstleistungsverkehrs aLs Giundfreileit, 153 Zenrscvar FOR
DAS GEsAmTE HANDELsmctr uNO WiRTscH rmRscHr [ZHR] 571, 588 (1989). For a brief explanation
of the concepts of pre-market control and post-market control, see supra notes 16, 18.
54. See, eg., Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at 3755, 2 C.M.LR. at 70; Case 279/80, Pro-
ceedings Against Webb, 1981 E.C.R. 3305, 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1982); Case 52/79, Procureur du Roi v.
Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. 833, 2 C.M.LR. 362 (1981); Joined Cases 110 & 111/78, Ministire Public v.
van Wesemael, 1979 E.C.R. 35, 3 C.M.L.R. 87 (1979); Case 33/74, van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de
Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, 1 C.M.LR. 298 (1975).
55. Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at 3802, 2 C.M.L.R. at 101.
56. Id. at 3804, 2 C.M.L.R. at 102. The Court refers to public interest and the general good as a
justification for any measures of the states that burden the interstate trade of goods or the interstate
provision of services. Id at 3803-04, 2 C.M.L.R. at 103. See also Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. at 856, 2
C.M.L.R. at 394. The public interest must be of a non-economic and non-protective nature. Whereas
the justifications contained in EEC Treaty Articles 36 and 56 may justify even discriminatory meas-
ures, the Court held that a justification of measures that burden the interstate trade by public interest
is only available for non-discriminatory measures. Id.
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ment57 does not guarantee the necessary level of protection, and if the
relevant regulations are not excessive. 58 Choice-of-law rules that call for
the application of the law of the state of destination must be judged by
these standards.
In contrast, the ECJ has not yet dealt with regulations of a state
where the service provider is established that would burden the export of
insurance services to other member states.59 The freedom to provide
services should also apply to these regulations. This view is supported by
the wording of several EEC Treaty articles,6° particularly Article 34.61
Since Article 59 is broad in scope, it can easily be interpreted to encom-
pass a prohibition against discriminatory standards similar to that given
by the ECJ to Article 34.62 It should be noted, however, that this prohibi-
tion is a rather restrictive interpretation of Article 34,63 and the ECJ is
likely to interpret Article 59 in the same restrictive fashion.64
2. Regulations Concerning the Reception of Services by the Policyholder.
There are two subcategories within the category of reception of services:
regulations of the state of the policyholder's residence and regulations of
the state of the insurer's establishment.
In the first subcategory, which includes cases where the recipient
seeks insurance abroad, the freedom to provide services extends to the
right to receive services. Thus, member states may not prohibit their resi-
dents from traveling to another member state in order to obtain services
57. The state of the service provider's establishment is the state where the insurer has its central
administration or its branch or agency that transacts the relevant business. Second Non-Life Direc-
tive, supra note 10, arts. 2(c), 2(e).
58. Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at 3804, 2 C.M.L.R. at 102-03. See also Case 154/89,
Commission v. France, Feb. 26, 1991, not yet reported (addressing the principle of proportionality).
59. But see the Court's remark en passant in Case 252/83, Commission v. Denmark, 1986
E.C.R. 3713, 3750-51, 2 C.M.LR. 169, 186 (1987).
60. See EEC TREA-Y arts. 30-36.
61. Article 34 prohibits all quantitative restrictions regarding the export of goods, as between
member States, and all measures having an equivalent effect. Id. art. 34.
62. See Case 158/80, Summary Proceedings against Sergius Oebel, 1981 E.C.R. 1993, 2009, 1
C.M.L.R. 390, 405 (1983). It is questionable, however, whether this standard will always lead to an
acceptable result. For example, a good argument can be made for allowing the manufacture of a
product in state A which contravenes the relevant regulations of state A concerning the composition
of the product, if the product is in conformity with regulations of state B, the state to which it is to be
exclusively exported and sold.
63. See, eg., id. at 2009-10, 1 C.M.L.R. at 405; Case 15/79, P.B. Groenveld B.V. v. Produkt-
schap voor en Vlees, 1979 E.C.R. 3409, 3415, 1 C.M.LR. 207, 215 (1981).
64. The differentiation that the Court makes between the restrictive interpretation of EEC
Treaty Article 34 and the general approach it takes toward EEC Treaty Articles 30-36 is sensible in
the light of Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fiir Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 649, 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979) [hereinafter Cassis.de.Dion], and the development of the state-of-
origin principle, discussed infra note 68.
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there.65 This freedom to receive services also encompasses the freedom to
choose among the products and services offered throughout the EC.66
This freedom should allow consumers to make a purchase in a foreign
member state under the same conditions as the citizens of that state.
In GB.Inno.BM, for example, the ECJ held that Article 30 of the
EEC Treaty guaranteed a consumer's right to travel to a different member
state to make a purchase under the same conditions that apply to the
citizens of that member state.67 Extending this interpretation to EEC
Treaty Article 59 is consistent with the concept of a single unified market
increasingly dominated by the "state-of-origin principle."' 68 Any regula-
tion of the state of the recipient's residence that interferes with the free-
dom of the purchaser to receive services in another state should have to
meet an exacting standard; in order to justify the application of such regu-
lations there must be an imperative reason based on the public interest. 69
In the second subcategory, when regulations of the state of the in-
surer's establishment burden the reception of services by out-of-state re-
cipients, a simple discrimination standard70 appears to be adequate. 71
This also seems to be consistent with the relevant decisions of the ECJ.72
65. See Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R.
377, 3 C.M.L.R. 57 (1985).
66. See, e.g., THOMAS OPrmu ANN, EuRoPntecHr S 24, at 578 (1991); STE'AN VOLKER, PAssIVE
DIENSTLESTUNGSFREIHErr iM EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFrSRECHT, reprinted in 21 TOBINoER SCHPIFTEN
ZUM INTERNATIONALEN UND EUROPAISCHEN REcHT (Thomas Oppermann et al. eds., 1990).
67. See Case 362/88, GB-Inno-BM v. Confideration du Commarce Luxembourgeois A.S.B.L.,
1990 E.C.R. 667, 686, 2 C.M.LR. 801, 816 (1991). Article 30 of the EEC Treaty states that
"[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without preju-
dice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States." EEC TREATY art. 30.
68. Compare Cassis-de-Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 649, 3 C.M.LR. at 494 (state-of-origin principle)
with Second Council Directive 89/646 of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, Regula-
tion and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit
Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780, arts. 4-6, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1, 4-5 (single-license
principle).
According to the "state-of-origin principle", products and services that conform to the standards
of production their state of origin may generally be sold everywhere, within the limits required by the
general welfare of the state of destination. Since the state of importation must consider the regula-
tions of the state of origin, its authority to regulate is subordinate to the authority of the state of
origin. In contrast, the state of origirt cannot be obliged to take notice of the potentially differing
regulations of states of destination, with the exception of cases covered by Oebel, 1981 E.C.R. at
1993, 1 C.M.LR. at 406.
69. For a discussion of the concept of public interest, see supra note 56.
70. In this context, a discrimination standard means that a state may not directly or indirectly
discriminate against foreign nationals by treating its own nationals more preferably.
71. See discussion infra part IV.
72. See GB-Inno-BM, 1990 E.C.R. at 686, 2 C.M.L.R. at 816 (holding that a consumer has the
right to purchase under the same conditions as the local population). See also Case 186/87, Cowan v.
Tr&sor Public, 1989 E.C.R. 195, 220-22, 2 C.M.L.R. 613, 630-32 (1990) (holding EEC Treaty Article
7 applicable to conditions not directly related to the purchased product or service).
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These varying standards can be explained by the fact that regulations
of the state of the insurer's establishment that burden or restrict the inter-
state reception of services on a nondiscriminatory basis conform to the
state-of-origin principle. It would be unwarranted to apply a stricter stan-
dard in favor of service recipients who are residents of other member
states. In contrast, when regulations of the policyholder's state of resi-
dence burden the out-of-state reception of services they conflict with the
state-of-origin principle, which lies at the heart of the single market.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNITY CONFLICTS LAWS
A. Location of Risk as the Basic Connecting Factor
1. The Role of Risk Location in the Second Non-Life Directive.
Throughout the Second Non-Life Directive the location of risk is used as
the basic connecting factor for jurisdictional and choice-of-law purposes.73
For example, the authority to regulate the interstate provision of services
lies with the state of the insurer's establishment and the state in which the
risk is located. 74 Only the state in which the risk is located may impose
additional administrative requirements on the provision of interstate serv-
ices.75 Furthermore, the state in which the risk is located also possesses
exclusive legislative jurisdiction over taxes on premiums and tax-like
charges.76
2. The Second NonLife Directive's Divergence from EEC Treaty Article
59. The use of risk location as the basic connecting factor of the Second
Non-Life Directive conflicts with Article 59 of the EEC Treaty. Article 59
contains no reference to the location of risk as a connecting factor. In-
stead, it uses the establishment of the service provider and the establish-
ment or residence of the recipient as the decisive criteria to define its
scope. 77 In Commission v. Germany, the ECJ defined the scope of Article
59 by exactly these criteria. 78
73. The Directive's provisions concerning the freedom to provide services apply only when an
enterprise situated in one member state covers a risk located in another member state. See, eg.,
Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 12(1).
74. 1d. arts. 12, 14-15. Article 15(1) speaks of a "Member State within the territory in which an
undertaking intends to provide services." Id. art. 15(1). According to Article 2(f), this is the "Mem-
ber State in which the risk is situated when it is covered by an establishment in another Member
State." Id. art. 2(f).
75. See id. art. 15.
76. Id. art. 25. Tax-like charge refers to any financial levy that, though not classified as tax,
nevertheless has the same effect, e.g., a lump-sum charge that becomes due at the conclusion of an
insurance contract.
77. Note that the terminology used here is the same as that used in the Second Non-Life Direc-
tive. See Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 2.
78. Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at 3801, 2 C.M.L.R. at 100.
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The ECJ also stated that the concept of consumer protection could
be used to justify insurance regulation by the policyholder's state of resi-
dence where insurance services were provided in the state. 79 Despite the
fact that the notion of services provided in a member state remains un-
clear, the Court held that this justification applied to consumers residing
in the state and to any local business activities that cater to local resi-
dents.80 While the risk usually will be located in the state where the poli-
cyholder resides, the Court recognized that special problems may arise
where the risk covered by the insurance contract is not situated in the
member state of the policyholder.
The Second Non-Life Directive addressed these special problems.
The Directive attributes legislative and enforcement jurisdiction to the
state of risk location when it differs from the state of the residence of the
policyholder in three specific situations:
(1) holiday insurance contracts of no more than four months
duration;
(2) insurance contracts covering buildings and their contents; and
(3) insurance contracts covering registered vehicles, the place of
registration being the location of the risk.81
In the first situation the law of the insurer's establishment will usually
apply. In that case there is no conflict with Article 59 since conflicts law
does not burden the insurer's activities. In the last two situations, how-
ever, the application of the law of the state where the risk is located is in
potential conflict with Article 59. For example, if the location of the
property or the place of registration of a vehicle do not coincide with the
insurer's state of establishment, or the policyholder's state of residence,
the Directive clashes with the EEC Treaty.
Regulations of a state where the risk is located that burden the inter-
state provision of services can hardly be justified by consumer protection
in cases where the policyholder is a resident of a different member state.
Consumer protection is a matter for the latter state to implement through
its national policy. However, a possible justification lies in the protection
of third parties. Hence, protection of persons injured by accidents may
79. Id. at 3803-07, 2 C.M.L.R. at 102-07. While the Court went into detail regarding the rele-
vant standards for state regulations, it was very brief on the issue of legislative jurisdiction. There are
also other justifications, such as third party protection.
80. Comparable questions concerning the legislative jurisdiction of the member states have been
touched upon in two decisions in which the Court expressly acknowledged the competence, i.e.,
legislative jurisdiction, of a member state to regulate minimum wages of the labor force "within" that
state. Case 113/89, Rush Portuguesa Limitida v. Office National d'Immigration, 1990 E.C.R. 1417, 2
C.M.L.R. 818 (1990); Joined Cases 62 & 63/81, Seco S.A. and Desquenne & Giral S.A. v. Etablisse-
ment d'Assurance, 1982 E.C.R. 223, 236-37 [1981-83 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
5 8811 (1982).
81. Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 2(d).
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qualify as a compelling reason for regulation by the state in which the risk
is located. Still, to justify burdening the provision of interstate services,
member states must do more than merely pay lip service to the concept of
third party protection. Third party protection is effective only if insur-
ance coverage for potentially dangerous property is made mandatory. 82
Thus, in a case where the state of risk location does not mandate coverage
of the relevant risk, the assignment to that state of legislative and enforce-
ment jurisdiction could burden the interstate provision of services and
therefore run afoul of Article 59.
3. The Compatibility of the Second Non-Life Directive's Choice-of-Law
Rules with EEC Treaty Article 59. The basic choice-of-law rule embodied
in the Second Non-Life Directive is consistent with EEC Treaty Article
59. The Directive mandates applying the law of the state in which the
risk is located if that state is also the state of the habitual residence of the
policyholder.8 3 If the policyholder does not reside in that state, the Direc-
tive provides for limited party autonomy8 4 by allowing the parties to
choose which member state's law will apply.8 5 Parties who select the con-
trolling law cannot complain that this law unjustifiably burdens the inter-
state trade in services. If the parties have not chosen a particular legal
system, the Second Non-Life Directive applies the law of the state with
which the contract is most closely connected; the Directive includes a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the state in which the risk is located.86
This presumption is inconsistent with the reasoning of Commission v. Ger-
many, which held that the member state where the policyholder resides
may specify an appropriate level of consumer protection.87 The fact that
the Directive's presumption in favor of the state of risk is rebuttable may,
nonetheless, prevent the relevant section from being invalidated by the
ECJ as a violation of EEC Treaty Article 59.
B. Nonconsensual Connecting Factors and Their Compatibility with
EEC Treaty Article 59
Mandatory choice-of-law provisions that compel the application of
the law of the state of the policyholder's residence have the potential to
82. This is because if insurance coverage is not mandatory, third party protection depends on
the arbitrary decision of the property owner to take out insurance.
83. Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(a).
84. Id. art. 7(l)(b). For a detailed analysis, see Christopher G. J. Morse, Party Autonomy in Inter-
national Insurance Contract Law, in INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW WrrHIN THE EEC (Fritz Reichert-
Facilides ed., forthcoming 1992).
85. If the policyholder resides in a non-member state, this country's law may be chosen as well.
Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 7(l)(b).
86. Id. art. 7(I)(h).
87. See Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at 3755, 2 C.M.LR. at 69.
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burden the interstate provision of insurance services. Such provisions,
for example, may force insurers to shape their policy conditions to con-
form to twelve different legal systems. Nevertheless, both the Second
Non-Life Directive and Second Life Directive apply this rule, while pro-
viding member states with the discretion to grant party autonomy.
8 8
The Second Non-Life Directive allows the member state in which the
risk is located, and in which the policyholder resides, to exclude party
autonomy altogether. 89 The conflict-of-law provision in the Second Life
Directive is similar; it provides for the application of the law of the state
of the policyholder's residence. 90 The member states are required to
grant the parties the right to choose the law of the policyholder's state of
nationality when this state and the state of the policyholder's residence
are not the same.91 The member states can, if they choose, grant the
parties a greater degree of autonomy-the right to choose the law of the
insurer's establishment. However, they are not obligated to do so.92 It is
doubtful whether this approach can be reconciled with the demands of
Article 59 which calls for a greater degree of party autonomy.
1. Mandatory Choice-of-Law Rules and Consumer Protection. The
concept of consumer protection generally can serve as a justification for
mandatory regulations of member states that burden the provision of in-
terstate insurance services. 93 Policyholders need at least minimal substan-
tive legal protection against unfair policy conditions. Such protection is
necessary irrespective of whether the insurer is domestic or foreign. The
consumer should also be protected against the application of an unfamil-
iar legal system, 94 the difficulties of obtaining adequate information, and
other disadvantages. 95 As the mandatory application of the law of the
policyholder's residence burdens the interstate provision of services, any
restriction on the parties' freedom to choose the law of the state of the
insurer's establishment must, as EEC Treaty Article 59 mandates, be nec-
essary in order to protect the consumer.
In analyzing whether an exclusion of party autonomy can be recon-
ciled with Article 59, a more specific analysis of three distinct issues is
required: whether consumer protection through mandatory provisions in
88. Id. art. 7(1)(a); Second Life Directive, supra note I1, art. 4(1).
89. See Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 7(I)(a).
90. See Second Life Directive, supra note II, arts. 4(1), 2(e).
91. See Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 4(2).
92. See id. art. 4(1).
93. This idea has been more extensively developed in RoTm, supra note 7, at 160-68.
94. Insurance regulations may impose legal warranties on policyholders of which they are not
aware of.
95. Such other disadvantages include the time lag and expense inherent in gathering informa-
tion and the uncertainties with respect to the interpretation of unfamiliar legal materials.
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the contract law of the state of the policyholder's residence justifies the
complete exclusion of party autonomy; whether protection against the ap-
plication of an unfamiliar legal system justifies the exclusion of party au-
tonomy; and whether merely providing adequate information on the
content of the chosen law, especially the law of the state of the insurer's
establishment, provides sufficient consumer protection.
a) Consumer Protection as a Justification for the Exclusion of any Choice-
of-Law is Potentially Inconsistent with EEC Treaty Article 59. Conflicts laws
that completely exclude party autonomy for the purposes of consumer
protection, such as those contained in the Second Non-Life Directive, are
difficult to defend. The ECJ, in Commission v. Germany, determined that
the public interest in consumer protection justifies restrictions on the
freedom to provide services by the state of destination only if the rules of
the state of origin do not already provide for the same level of protec-
tion.96 While Commission v. Germany dealt with administrative law provi-
sions concerning insurance supervision, this approach should also be
applied to mandatory contract law provisions. Therefore, the Second
Non-Life Directive's restriction on party autonomy is incompatible with
EEC Treaty Article 59 whenever the level of protection in the state of the
insurer's establishment equals or surpasses that of the state of destination.
If consumer protection standards are lower in the state of the in-
surer's establishment, a less restrictive alternative to the total exclusion of
the choice of the law of the state of the insurer's establishment should be
implemented.97 Such an alternative can be found in Rome Convention
Article 5(2). This Article combines the goals of party autonomy and con-
sumer protection by supplementing the chosen law with the consumer
protection laws of the consumer's residence when the chosen law does not
offer the consumer an equivalent level of protection.98 This standard is in
accord with the demands of Article 59.
The Second Non-Life Directive, and the Second Life Directive, devi-
ate from the principles of Rome Convention Article 5(2) for several rea-
sons.99 Contrary to some of its earlier proposals, the Second Non-Life
Directive tries to avoid the application of more than one legal system 1°° to
96. Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R at 3804, 2 C.M.L.R. at 103. For a discussion of the
concept of public interest, see supra note 56.
97. See Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at 3803, 2 C.M.L.R. at 102.
98. See Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(2).
99. See, e.g., RoTH, supra note 7, at 685-88.
100. More than one law is applied if, e.g., the law chosen by the parties and the mandatory
contract law of the state of the policyholder's residence apply.
Winter 1992]
144 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:129
a specific insurance contract. 1° 1 The Commission argued that the appli-
cation of more than one legal system would be both complicated and in-
adequate for a product defined by legal concepts.102 These legal systems
may also contain different concepts of consumer protection, which may
cause problems for the Court when attempting to compare and contrast
consumer protection standards of different member states as required by
the Rome Convention. 0 3
However, these arguments are fallacious. The ECJ has developed the
basic standard that rules or measures of the state of destination can be
applied only if those of the state of origin are not equivalent.10 4 Thus, a
comparison between the law of the policyholder's residence and the law of
the insurer's establishment, must be made regardless of the complexities.
In addition, it is arguably the responsibility of the parties, especially that
of the insurer who drafts the policy, to tackle the complex problems that
result from choosing a jurisdiction that is different from the jurisdiction
of the policyholder's residence. 10 5 From this perspective, the allowance
by Article 5(2) of the Rome Convention of at least some degree of party
autonomy would appear to be more consistent with the demands of Arti-
cle 59 of the EEC Treaty than the exclusion of party autonomy under the
Second Non-Life Directive.' 0 6
b) The Second Non-Life Directive Overly Restricts Party Autonomy.
Although the protection of the consumer against the application of an
unfamiliar legal system is an important consideration in conflicts law, the
preclusion of party autonomy exceeds the boundaries of what is necessary
to afford this protection. Therefore, the preclusion of party autonomy is
not the least restrictive alternative. A policyholder may sometimes be
more familiar with the legal system of the state of the insurer's establish-
ment than with the legal system of the state of the policyholder's resi-
dence.'0 7 There may also be cases in which the consumer approaches a
foreign insurer sua sponte 101 because of plans to relocate to the state of the
101. See the Commission's explanation for its revised proposal for the Second Non-Life Direc-
tive, submitted to the Council on Feb. 16, 1978, COM(78)63, Supp. I.
102. 1I
103. See Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(2).
104. See Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at 3808, 3813, 2 C.M.L.R. at 104-05; Case 279/80,
Proceeding Against Webb, 1981 E.C.R. 3305, 33i5-26, 1 C.M.LR. 719, 730 (1982).
105. Cf. RoTH, supra note 7, at 745.
106. See Second Non-Life Directive, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(a).
107. As an example, one may think of the case of a migrant worker from the state of the insurer's
establishment.
108. The Second Life Directive expressly takes account of situations where a consumer takes the
initiative in contracting with a foreign insurer. Second Life Directive Articles 13 and 14 state that the
member state of the policyholder's residence may not demand an authorization for doing business
where the consumer seeks out a foreign insurer. This is restricted to regulations concerning the
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insurer's establishment.10 9 The case for protection against the application
of an unfamiliar legal system is much weaker in these situations. A policy-
holder can be sufficiently protected against abusive choice-of-law provi-
sions imposed by a foreign insurer if the validity of these provisions is
made contingent upon the fulfillment of certain formal requirements,
such as a requirement that any choice-of-law provision be separately
signed by both parties' 10 or even be contained in a separate document.1 1
In any event, member states should not be permitted to exclude party
autonomy to the extent provided for in Second Non-Life Directive Arti-
cle 7(1)(a) and Second Life Directive Article 4(1).
c) Merely Providing Information on the Content of the Chosen Law is Insuf-
ficient to Protect the Consumer. Arguably, a requirement that the con-
sumer be informed of the specifics of the chosen law,112 the law of the
insurer's establishment and the law of the state of risk, is less restrictive
than applying the mandatory consumer protection rules of Rome Con-
vention Article 5(2).13 This argument appears to be supported by Cassis-
deDijon, in which the ECJ held that printing product information was as
effective a means of consumer protection as imposing mandatory rules
regarding the composition of products.114
supervision of interstate life insurance services. Second Life Directive, supra note 11, arts. 13-14. The
applicable choice-of-law provision is embodied in Article 4(l), which provides for the application of
the law of the policyholder's residence. Id. art. 4(1).
It seems doubtful whether anything else can be deduced from Second Life Directive Article
14(5). This provision restrains the member states in their ability to prohibit the policyholder to
conclude a contract that is valid under the law of the insurer's seat except to defend the ordre public of
that state. See id. art. 14(5). Viewed from the systematic set-up of the Second Life Directive, Article
14(5) is a provision that refers to administrative law, especially supervisory regulations of the member
state where the policyholder resides. It exerts some influence on the application of mandatory admin-
istrative law regulations that fall under Article 4(4), restricting their application to cases where the
ordre public requires such application. However, Second Life Directive Article 14(5) is not meant to
influence the conflicts rules for insurance contracts as such. This is the task of Second Life Directive
Article 4(l) and 4(2).
109. Other examples include situations in which the consumer opts for a foreign insurer simply
because of the insurer's reputation or because the foreign insurer offers coverage not available from
domestic insurers.
110. See Preliminary Proposal on the Law Applicable to Insurance Contracts, art. 3(1), EEC Doc.
2229/III/C/67-D rev. 4, 2 (1967) (German version); RoTm, supra note 7, at 681, 747.
111. See Fritz Reichert-Facilides, Zum internationalen Versicherungsvertragsrecht im Rahmen der EWG,
in I INSuRANCE LAw 465, 478 (1970) (Tribute to Antigono Donati).
112. Cf STEFAN GRUNDMANN, DAs EUROPXISCHE BANKAuFsicHTSREcHT WACHST ZUM SYsTEM 42
(1990).
113. EEC Treaty Article 59 requires that member states have to choose the alternative that least
restricts the interstate provision of services. EEC TREATY art. 59. The question remains whether
Article 59 demands a degree of party autonomy that exceeds the autonomy provided for by Article
5(2) of the Rome Convention.
114. See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 649, 664, 3 C.M.L.R. 494, 509-10 (1979). It should be noted, however, that in Cassis-de-Dijon
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However, it is doubtful whether this rationale can be extended to
insurance contracts, for the nature of insurance, as an intangible and
complex legal product, is fundamentally different than other products.
Often only an insurance expert can understand the complex policy condi-
tions and the consequences of applying different laws to insurance con-
tracts. Furthermore, merely providing information to consumers fails to
take into account the generally weaker bargaining position of the policy-
holder. Such inequality may be more effectively addressed by mandatory
provisions of substantive insurance contract law. Thus, the combination
of the unique nature of insurance products and the often encountered
unequal bargaining power of the parties helps explain why merely provid-
ing the policyholder with information about the negative consequences of
choosing a foreign legal system does not amount to effective consumer
protection.
2. Connecting Points and the Right of the Consumer to Purchase Insur-
ance Out-of-State. As stated above, EEC Treaty Article 59 establishes the
freedom of both the insurer to provide interstate services and the pur-
chaser to receive such services. Accordingly, purchasers may obtain poli-
cies from foreign insurers under the same conditions as residents in the
state of the insurer's establishment, subject only to legitimate restrictions
justified by reasons of the public interest. EEC Treaty Article 59 thereby
limits the ability of the state of the purchaser's habitual residence to apply
its own laws.115 However, protection of the public interest does not al-
ways justify the application of consumer protection laws on behalf of local
residents.
It is questionable whether a purchaser who actively seeks a policy
from an out-of-state insurer needs protection. This individual will usually
be a well-informed consumer who does not need to be protected against
the application of an unfamiliar law or a law that does not offer the same
level of protection as that of his residence. The mandatory application of
the law of the state of the policyholder's residence may severely burden an
insurance company that is not doing business in that state. This might
lead this company to deny coverage to out-of-state residents. This burden
on the insurer is disproportionate to the aim being pursued. There
should be no difference between the importance given to consumer pro-
tection in the case of insurance contracts involving parties of non-mem-
ber states and insurance contracts between parties of member states. The
application of the law of the policyholder's residence, as provided by the
the Court interpreted EEC Treaty Article 30 which deals with the prohibition of quantitative restric-
tions. For a survey of the relevant case law, see G.ABrrz, supra note 47, art. 30, at 12.
115. Furthermore, less restrictive alternatives may not be available.
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Second Non-Life and the Second Life Directives, is inconsistent with the
basic principles of Rome Convention Article 5 regarding risks located
outside the EC. Rome Convention Article 5 limits the applicability of
mandatory consumer protection legislation of the policyholder's state to
settings in which the policyholder has purchased the insurance in circum-
stances where there is a close connection to his state of residence. 116
Based on this perspective, neither Second Non-Life Directive Article
7(1)(a) nor Second Life Directive Article 4(1) can be read in accord with
the standards established by EEC Treaty Article 59.
The deviation by both insurance Directives from the criteria estab-
lished in Rome Convention Article 5 cannot be justified by the notion of
consumer protection. Article 5 was regarded as unacceptable because its
provisions would facilitate the purchase of out-of-state insurance coverage
at terms that intrastate insurers, which are bound by the local law, could
not offer; this would place national insurance industries at a competitive
disadvantage.
The choice-of-law provisions of the Directives were framed on the
assumption that any conflicts rule should take into account the principle
of undistorted competition. 117 However, secondary Community legisla-
tion that is meant to effectuate this principle may not infringe upon the
freedom to provide and receive services.118 If the Community deems it
necessary to prevent a distortion of competition in the insurance market,
it should harmonize the relevant substantive laws rather than prescribe
choice-of-law rules that run counter to EEC Treaty Article 59.
The only way to reach a result that conforms to the standards of
EEC Treaty Article 59 would be to obligate the member states to grant
greater party autonomy than the minimal level mandated by the two Di-
rectives.119 Parties should enjoy unrestricted freedom to choose the law
of the state of the insurer's establishment in those situations where the
Rome Convention would not apply the law of the state of the consumer's
residence.' 20 Furthermore, restricted party autonomy, as provided for in
Rome Convention Article 5(2), is preferable to a total exclusion of party
autonomy.
116. Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(2).
117. See EEC TRATY art. 3(f); supra note 38 and accompanying text. Cf. RoT, supra note 7, at
718 n.117.
118. For a general discussion of supervisory regulations, see Wulf-Henning Roth, Grundlagen des
gemeinsamen europdischen Versicherungsmarktes, 54 RABasZ 63, 118-20 (1990).
119. Recall that the two Directives leave it to the member states to determine whether to allow
for greater party autonomy than the minimum set by the Directives. See supra notes 89-90 and accom-
panying text.
120. Cf. Rome Convention, supra note 6, arts. 4, 5(3).
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The conclusion that the choice-of-law provisions of the two Direc-
tives conflict with the EEC Treaty appears to have been accepted by the
Commission itself. The proposal for a third non-life directive12' attempts
to solve this problem by including the following conflict law provision:
[t]he Member State in which the risk is situated shall not prevent the
policy-holder from concluding a contract conforming with the rules of
the home Member State, so long as it does not conflict with legal provi-
sions protecting the general good in the Member State in which the
risk is situated.122
According to the Commission, proposed Article 25 is intended to serve as
a legal bridge between the choice-of-law rules of the Second Non-Life Di-
rective and EEC Treaty Article 59.123 Apparently, the Commission as-
sumes that a member state that enacts the choice-of-law rules set forth in
the Second Non-Life Directive may under certain circumstances infringe
upon the freedom to provide services.
However, this provision does not fulfill its intended function. If
there is a conflict between Article 59 of the EEC Treaty and the choice-of-
law rules, as set forth in the Directives, it is the duty of the Commission
to propose choice-of-law rules that conform to Article 59 and not merely
to restate the conflict and leave it to the member states to rectify the
problem.
121. Proposal for a Third Council Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Ad-
ministrative Provisions Relating to Direct Insurance Other than Life Assurance and Amending Direc-
tives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC, 1990 O.J. (C 244) 28.
122. Id. art. 25. Compare id. with Proposal for a Third Council Directive on the Coordination of
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Direct Life Assurance and Amending
Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC, art. 24, 1991 O.J. (C 99) 2, 2.
123. Cf. Patrick Pearson, Opening Address, in INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW WITHIN THE EEC,
supra note 84.
